An axiomatic re-characterization of the Kemeny rule

Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh () and Ton Storcken ()
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Mohsen Pourpouneh: University of Copenhagen
Ton Storcken: Maastricht University

Review of Economic Design, 2022, vol. 26, issue 3, No 10, 447-467

Abstract: Abstract The Kemeny rule is one of the well studied decision rules. In this paper we show that the Kemeny rule is the only rule which is unbiased, monotone, strongly tie-breaking, strongly gradual, and weighed tournamental. We show that these conditions are logically independent.

Keywords: Kemeny rule; Preference aggregation; Axiomatic characterization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00259-2

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