Mechanism design by observant and informed planners

Shurojit Chatterji () and Arunava Sen ()
Additional contact information
Shurojit Chatterji: Singapore Management University
Arunava Sen: Indian Statistical Institute

Review of Economic Design, 2022, vol. 26, issue 4, No 9, 665-677

Abstract: Abstract We study the mechanism design problem where the planner can observe ex-post the first-ranked alternatives or peaks of voter preferences. We contrast this with the design problem where the planner has ex-ante information regarding the peaks of voter preferences.

Keywords: Local strategy-proofness; Strategy-proofness; Unanimity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10058-021-00281-4 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:reecde:v:26:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s10058-021-00281-4

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10058

DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00281-4

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Economic Design is currently edited by Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

More articles in Review of Economic Design from Springer, Society for Economic Design
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().