A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule

Hidekazu Anno () and Sui Takahashi ()
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Hidekazu Anno: University of Tsukuba
Sui Takahashi: University of Tsukuba

Review of Economic Design, 2023, vol. 27, issue 1, No 5, 133-137

Abstract: Abstract This note provides an alternative proof of strategy-proofness of the top-trading cycles rule for housing markets based on the argument used in the (Hatfield and Milgrom in Am Econom Rev 95:913–935, 2005) proof of Theorems 10 and 11. In other words, we point out that their proof technique for strategy-proofness of the doctor-optimal stable rule for matching with contracts is also applicable to that of the core rule for housing markets.

Keywords: Market design; Matching with contracts; Housing market; Core; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00271-6

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