Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization

Jac Heckelman

Review of Economic Design, 2023, vol. 27, issue 1, No 4, 125-132

Abstract: Abstract An Arrowian Social Welfare Function (SWF) represents a weak ordering of the alternative set derived entirely from individual preference orders. Negative voting considers only a voter’s least preferred alternative. We introduce the majority loser opposition property which requires that any alternative ranked last by a majority of voters must be ranked last in the social ordering. We show a SWF satisfies anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, continuity, and majority loser opposition if and only if it is equivalent to negative voting.

Keywords: Social welfare function; Axiomatic properties; Majority loser; Scoring function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00272-5

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