Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects

Ranojoy Basu () and Conan Mukherjee ()
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Ranojoy Basu: Indian Institute of Management Udaipur
Conan Mukherjee: Economics Group, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta

Review of Economic Design, 2023, vol. 27, issue 4, No 3, 763-790

Abstract: Abstract This paper characterizes Vickrey auction with reserve price [VARP], in single and multiple objects settings, using normative and strategic axioms. In particular, it provides a new interpretation of reserve price as the infimum of a particular set of non-negative real numbers. In the single object case, we find that a strategyproof mechanism satisfies anonymity in welfare, agent sovereignty and non-bossiness in decision if and only if it has a VARP allocation rule. We extend this result to the multiple objects setting by introducing a continuity condition, and showing that any reasonable sale procedure (fixed prior to the realization of the number of available objects) involving continuous and strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy the aforementioned properties: must always use VARP with a fixed reserve price.

Keywords: Anonymity in welfare; Agent sovereignty; Non-bossiness in decision; Continuity; Strategyproof mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00320-8

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