Trade of a common value good

Steven R. Williams ()
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Steven R. Williams: University of Melbourne

Review of Economic Design, 2023, vol. 27, issue 4, No 1, 724 pages

Abstract: Abstract When traders have private information about a common value good, adverse selection alone is insufficient to prevent trade of the good and estimation of the common value based upon the traders’ private information. We explore sufficient conditions for nonexistence of trading mechanisms in which trade of a common good occurs, along with cases in which such mechanisms exist.

Keywords: Common value; Incentive compatibility; Ex post; Adverse selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00322-6

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