Inequalities and segregation: can welfarist local governments struggle against both simultaneously?
Remy Oddou ()
Additional contact information
Remy Oddou: Economix, UPL, Univ Paris Nanterre, CNRS
Review of Economic Design, 2023, vol. 27, issue 4, No 6, 849-866
Abstract:
Abstract This paper analyses how progressive taxation schemes, implemented by local welfarist government, affect the segregative properties of endogenous jurisdiction formation, using a model where local jurisdictions produce a local public good, financed by a progressive tax on households’ wealth. A jurisdiction is composed of all the households that live in the same place. Local taxation parameters are determined so as to maximize a social welfare function. Households can “vote with their feet”, which means that they can choose to move to the jurisdiction that offers the package “tax - amount of public good” that provides the highest utility level. The main result of this article is the proof that the maximin criterion is more segregative than the utilitarian one. Consequently, it suggests that local governments can not simultaneously struggle against inequalities and segregation.
Keywords: Jurisdictions; Segregation; Welfarism; Redistribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 H31 H73 R13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10058-023-00326-w Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:reecde:v:27:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s10058-023-00326-w
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10058
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00326-w
Access Statistics for this article
Review of Economic Design is currently edited by Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers
More articles in Review of Economic Design from Springer, Society for Economic Design
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().