Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures

Yukinori Iwata ()
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Yukinori Iwata: Nishogakusha University

Review of Economic Design, 2023, vol. 27, issue 4, No 7, 867-891

Abstract: Abstract We investigate the strategic manipulation of two-stage voting procedures with the nomination process. First, some alternatives are nominated by aggregating voters’ opinions, which are positive or negative views about which alternatives are eligible as candidates for collective decision-making. Subsequently, the voting outcome is chosen from the set of nominated alternatives by aggregating the voters’ preferences. We extend the notion of strategy-proofness to the two-stage voting procedures and propose its weaker version, called opinion-based strategy-proofness. We show that a Gibbard–Satterthwaite-type impossibility is still valid, but that there exists an opinion-based strategy-proof two-stage voting procedure that is strongly efficient, non-dictatorial, strongly anonymous, and nomination stable.

Keywords: Strategic nomination; Opinion-based strategy-proofness; Two-stage voting procedure; Strategy-proofness; Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00327-9

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