Efficient mask allocation during a pandemic

Wei-Cheng Chen (), Lin Chen () and Yi-Cheng Kao ()
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Wei-Cheng Chen: Academia Sinica
Lin Chen: Vanderbilt University
Yi-Cheng Kao: Chung Yuan Christian University

Review of Economic Design, 2024, vol. 28, issue 2, No 2, 275-311

Abstract: Abstract We analyze the allocation of face masks to minimize mortality during a pandemic through airborne transmission. When the initial distribution of masks is private information, the optimal allocation achieved by a sophisticated mechanism in most cases maximizes the coverage rate by incentivizing individuals who initially own a mask to reveal this information in exchange for a better chance to receive masks in the future. We propose a novel and simple mechanism, which reduces death by a sizable number compared with simple random assignment. Our simulation shows that, for low to medium early coverage rates, the new mechanism approximately attains the minimum mortality.

Keywords: COVID-19; Face masks; Medical rationing; Market design; SIR model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 D82 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00340-y

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