Characterization of maxmed mechanisms for multiple objects

Ranojoy Basu () and Conan Mukherjee ()
Additional contact information
Ranojoy Basu: Indian Institute of Management Udaipur
Conan Mukherjee: Indian Institute of Management Calcutta

Review of Economic Design, 2024, vol. 28, issue 2, No 3, 313-330

Abstract: Abstract This paper presents an extension of maxmed mechanisms introduced by Sprumont (J Econ Theory 148:1102–1121, 2013) to the multiple homogeneous object setting. To address the complexities of the multiple objects setting, we consider special families of mechanisms, which contain a mechanism for each possible number of available objects. We interpret these families as ex-ante sale procedures, which specify different mechanisms to allocate different quantities of objects. We identify and completely characterize the maxmed families, which use the (extended) maxmed mechanisms to allocate any number of available objects while using the same non-negative reserve price. The maxmed families turn out to be the only families that are Pareto optimal among well-behaved families comprising mechanisms that satisfy a set of desirable axioms including the ones used by Sprumont (J Econ Theory 148:1102–1121, 2013) : anonymity, strategyproofness, no-envy, feasibility and individual rationality.

Keywords: Maxmed mechanism; Strategyproof mechanism; Multiple object allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10058-023-00341-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:reecde:v:28:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s10058-023-00341-x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10058

DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00341-x

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Economic Design is currently edited by Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

More articles in Review of Economic Design from Springer, Society for Economic Design
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().