A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders

Jianxin Yi

Review of Economic Design, 2024, vol. 28, issue 2, No 4, 345 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we focus on the domain of decreasing marginal valuations and show that in the presence of budget-constrained bidders there is no multi-unit auction that satisfies the following four properties: incentive compatibility, Pareto optimality, individual rationality and no positive transfers. This result strengthens the impossibility results of two previous studies.

Keywords: Multi-unit auctions; Budget constraints; Incentive compatibility; Individual rationality; Pareto optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00342-w

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