Disclosure services and welfare gains in matching markets for indivisible assets

Kei Kawakami ()
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Kei Kawakami: Aoyama Gakuin University

Review of Economic Design, 2024, vol. 28, issue 3, No 1, 485-532

Abstract: Abstract We present a competitive matching model in which indivisible assets are reallocated among many traders. The model has three features: (i) traders are heterogeneous in their prospects as buyers, sellers, and also in their stand-alone values with endowed assets, (ii) buyers do not know true values of assets sold, (iii) sellers can disclose values of their assets by paying fees. Despite its complexity, the model admits closed-form solutions. Two main results emerge. First, if full Disclosure is facilitated by a monopolist, it captures a large fraction of the welfare gains. Second, adding the option of minimum disclosure, when combined with a cap regulation on price-dependent fees for full disclosure, significantly weakens the monopolist’s power.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Disclosure; Market segmentation; Matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 G3 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00352-2

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