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And the first runner-up is...: comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests

Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee () and Theodore L. Turocy
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Subhasish M. Chowdhury: University of Sheffield
Anwesha Mukherjee: Technische Universitat München
Theodore L. Turocy: University of East Anglia

Review of Economic Design, 2025, vol. 29, issue 3, No 4, 447-477

Abstract: Abstract We characterise the strategic equivalence among k-winner contests using simultaneous and sequential winner selection. We test this prediction of strategic equivalence using a series of laboratory experiments, contrasting 1-winner contests with 2-winner contests, varying in the latter whether the outcome is revealed sequentially or in a single stage. We find that in the long run, average bidding levels are similar across strategically-equivalent contests. However, adaptation in 2-winner contests is slower and less systematic, which is consistent with the property that simultaneous winner selection results in outcomes that are more random than in the 1-winner case.

Keywords: Lottery contest; Multi-winner contests; Learning; Experiment; Strategic equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00315-5

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