Dynamic team contests with complementary efforts

Maria Arbatskaya () and Hideo Konishi ()
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Maria Arbatskaya: Emory University
Hideo Konishi: Boston College

Review of Economic Design, 2025, vol. 29, issue 3, No 9, 633 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we study dynamic team contests. In the framework of a Tullock contest between two teams that are generating impacts according to the Cobb–Douglas effort aggregation function, we examine how equilibrium efforts and winning probabilities depend on the timing of the actions. We show that in contrast to synchronous contests, asynchronous contests with publicly observable actions do not result in the same equilibrium outcome as the one-stage contest; they are strategically unbalancing, leading to more lopsided contests. The results have implications about the design of team contests in which efforts are complementary.

Keywords: Team contest; Group contest; Complementarity in efforts; Order of moves; Commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D23 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00332-y

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