Mapping an information design game into an all-pay auction

Oleg Muratov ()
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Oleg Muratov: University of Bern

Review of Economic Design, 2025, vol. 29, issue 3, No 6, 513-543

Abstract: Abstract I formally establish the existence of a mapping between a class of information design games with multiple senders and a class of all-pay auctions. I fully characterize this mapping and show how to use it to find equilibria in the information design game. The mapping allows for a straightforward comparative statics analysis of equilibria in the latter class of games. I use it to study the effect of the tie-breaking rule on the distributions of posteriors and the receiver’s payoff.

Keywords: All-pay auctions; Contests; Information design; Sender–receiver; Project selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00334-w

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