Nash-implementation of the weak Pareto choice rule for indecomposable environments

Hiroaki Osana
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Hiroaki Osana: Department of Economics, Keio University, 2-15-45 Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo 108, Japan

Review of Economic Design, 1997, vol. 3, issue 1, 57-74

Abstract: A feasible mechanism is constructed which weakly Nash-implements the weak Pareto choice rule over a certain class of indecomposable pure-exchange environments, where there may be no private goods whose consumption has no external effects.

Keywords: Feasible mechanism; Nash implementation; weak Pareto choice rule; indecomposable environments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D52 D61 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-11-27
Note: Received: 30 November 1995 / Accepted: 24 June 1997
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