Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market

Antonio Romero-Medina ()
Additional contact information
Antonio Romero-Medina: Departament of Economics, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521, USA
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

Review of Economic Design, 1998, vol. 3, issue 2, 137-147

Abstract: I analyze the admission mechanism used in Spanish universities. The system is open to strategic manipulation. This is because students are not allowed to express the whole list of available options. However, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Nash equilibrium and the student's optimum in strong equilibrium. The mechanism also implements the students' optimum, in Nash equilibrium, under the class of "non-reverse" preferences. All these properties come from the fact that colleges do not have the opportunity to misrepresent their preferences.

JEL-codes: C71 C78 D78 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-03-13
Note: Received: 30 June 1995 / Accepted: 31 January 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/papers/8003002/80030137.pdf (application/pdf)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/1005 ... 03002/80030137.ps.gz (application/postscript)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:137-147

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10058

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Economic Design is currently edited by Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

More articles in Review of Economic Design from Springer, Society for Economic Design
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().