Impossibility of Nash implementation in two-person economies

Shinsuke Nakamura ()
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Shinsuke Nakamura: Faculty of Economics, Keio University, 2-15-45 Mita Minato-ku, Tokyo 108, Japan

Review of Economic Design, 1998, vol. 3, issue 2, 159-165

Abstract: In this note, we prove two impossibility results of Nash implementation in two-person economies. First, we will show the non-existence of continuous and balanced mechanisms which implement the Walrasian correspondence. Second, by adding a convexity assumption of mechanisms, we present the impossibility of continuous implementation of Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations in balanced way.

JEL-codes: D51 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-03-13
Note: Received: 16 April 1996 / Accepted: 25 April 1997
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