Implementing action profiles with sequential mechanisms

Sandro Brusco

Review of Economic Design, 1998, vol. 3, issue 3, 300 pages

Abstract: In this paper we consider the problem of a principal with many agents who desires to implement a given action profile. Agents observe the actions taken by their colleagues, and this information can be exploited by the principal. Sufficient conditions for implementation under various informational structures are provided.

JEL-codes: C7 D7 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-07-03
Note: Received: 6 April 1996 / Accepted: 19 April 1998
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