Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis

Dirk Van de gaer, Marc Fleurbaey and Walter Bossert

Review of Economic Design, 1999, vol. 4, issue 1, 35-55

Abstract: This paper examines how the first-best models of compensation based on the agents' talents and responsibilities analyzed in some recent contributions can be extended to a second-best context. A few social criteria are proposed and compared to alternative approaches by Roemer and Van de gaer.

Keywords: Compensation; optimal tax; second-best; opportunities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02-09
Note: Received: 5 March 1997 / Accepted: 19 August 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/papers/9004001/90040035.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:35-55

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10058

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Economic Design is currently edited by Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

More articles in Review of Economic Design from Springer, Society for Economic Design
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().