Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal's renegotiation offer

Hiroshi Osano

Review of Economic Design, 1999, vol. 4, issue 2, 177 pages

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to explore a mechanism for supporting desired equilibrium actions in a one-principal, multi-agent model when the principal makes a renegotiation offer. We show that there exists a mechanism in which the principal's most preferred mixed strategy is always supported.

Keywords: Renegotiation; multi-agent; implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-06-24
Note: Received: 30 May 1997 / Accepted: 10 October 1998
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