A note on van Damme's mechanism

Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg
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Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg: Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld, P.O. Box 100131, D-33501 Bielefeld, Germany

Review of Economic Design, 1999, vol. 4, issue 2, 179-187

Abstract: We consider (two-person) bargaining games and we assume that the agents want to apply two possibly different bargaining solutions. A mechanism is a function which assigns an allocation to every bargaining game and every pair of bargaining solutions. Examining van Damme's mechanism (1986) from a cooperative point of view we see that it fails to satisfy Pareto-optimality. By modifying it we propose a new mechanism yielding the same conclusions as the original while enjoying some additional desirable properties.

Keywords: Meta-bargaining; Nash bargaining solution; non-cooperative approach; cooperative approach; mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-06-24
Note: Received: 8 August 1998 / Accepted: 15 October 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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