A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets

Ezra Einy () and David Wettstein ()
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Ezra Einy: Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P.O. Box 653, Beer Sheva, Israel 84105

Review of Economic Design, 1999, vol. 4, issue 3, 219-230

Abstract: This paper provides a non-cooperative interpretation for bargaining sets concepts in economic environments. We investigate the implementability of the Aumann-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets, and provide mechanisms whose subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes realize these sets. These mechanisms, in contrast to general mechanisms suggested in the implementation literature, have a natural structure closely related to that of the rationale underlying the bargaining sets. Furthermore, the strategy sets consist mainly of allocations and coalitions (thus avoiding any reference to preference parameters) and are finite dimensional.

Keywords: Implementation; bargaining sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-09-24
Note: Received: 17 February 1997 / Accepted: 2 February 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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