Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem

Maria-Angeles de Frutos

Review of Economic Design, 1999, vol. 4, issue 3, 255-272

Abstract: In a bankruptcy problem framework we consider rules immune to possible manipulations by the creditors involved in the problem via merging or splitting of their individual claims. The paper provides characterization theorems for the non manipulable rules, the no advantageous merging parametric rules and the no advantageous splitting parametric rules.

Keywords: Axiomatic analysis; merging; splitting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-09-24
Note: Received: 24 February 1998 / accepted: 9 March 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (67)

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