Solutions for cooperative games with r alternatives
M.J. Albizuri (),
Juan Carlos Santos () and
José Zarzuelo ()
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M.J. Albizuri: Department of Applied Economy I, Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea/Universidad del PaÎs Vasco, Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre 83, E-48015 Bilbao, Spain
Review of Economic Design, 1999, vol. 4, issue 4, 345-356
We consider games with n players and r alternatives. In these games each player must choose one and only one alternative, reaching an ordered partition of the set of players. An extension of the Shapley value to this framework is studied.
Keywords: Shapley value; cooperative games with alternatives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Received: 1 November 1997 / Accepted: 24 January 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:345-356
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