Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness

Peter Sudhölter and Bezalel Peleg

Review of Economic Design, 1999, vol. 4, issue 4, 387 pages

Abstract: We prove that multidimensional generalized median voter schemes are coalition-proof.

Keywords: Single-peaked preference; coalition-proof equilibrium; generalized median voter scheme (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-12-15
Note: Received: 16 July 1998 / Accepted 23 March 1999
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Working Paper: Single peakedness and coalition proofness (2017)
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