Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule when all single-peaked preferences are admissible

John Weymark

Review of Economic Design, 1999, vol. 4, issue 4, 389-393

Abstract: Sprumont (1991) has established that the only allocation rule for the division problem that is strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous is the uniform rule when the domain is the set of all possible profiles of continuous single-peaked preferences. Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule is shown to hold on any larger domain of single-peaked preferences.

Keywords: Division problem; uniform rule; strategy-proofness; single-peaked preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-12-15
Note: Received: 15 December 1998 / Accepted: 12 April 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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