original papers: Strategyproof multiple assignment using quotas

Szilvia Pápai ()

Review of Economic Design, 2000, vol. 5, issue 1, 105 pages

Abstract: The allocation of heterogeneous and indivisible objects is considered where there is no medium of exchange. We characterize the set of strategyproof, nonbossy, Pareto-optimal, and neutral social choice functions when preferences are monotonic and quantity-monotonic. The characterized sets of social choice functions are sequential; agents are assigned their favorite objects among the objects not given to others before them, subject to a quota.

Keywords: Strategyproof; indivisible goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D63 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-04-18
Note: Received: 5 January 1999 / Accepted: 14 June 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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