original papers: Strategyproof multiple assignment using quotas
Review of Economic Design, 2000, vol. 5, issue 1, 105 pages
The allocation of heterogeneous and indivisible objects is considered where there is no medium of exchange. We characterize the set of strategyproof, nonbossy, Pareto-optimal, and neutral social choice functions when preferences are monotonic and quantity-monotonic. The characterized sets of social choice functions are sequential; agents are assigned their favorite objects among the objects not given to others before them, subject to a quota.
Keywords: Strategyproof; indivisible goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D63 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Received: 5 January 1999 / Accepted: 14 June 1999
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