original papers: Coalition formation in general NTU games

Anke Gerber

Review of Economic Design, 2000, vol. 5, issue 2, 149-175

Abstract: A general nontransferable utility (NTU) game is interpreted as a collection of pure bargaining games that can be played by individual coalitions. The threatpoints or claims points respectively, in these pure bargaining games reflect the players' opportunities outside a given coalition. We develop a solution concept for general NTU games that is consistent in the sense that the players' outside opportunities are determined by the solution to a suitably defined reduced game. For any general NTU game the solution predicts which coalitions are formed and how the payoffs are distributed among the players.

Keywords: Endogenous coalition formation; bargaining; outside opportunities. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-07-06
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