original papers: Altruism, redistribution and social insurance

Udo Ebert and Oskar von dem Hagen ()
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Oskar von dem Hagen: Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, D-26111 Oldenburg, Germany

Review of Economic Design, 2000, vol. 5, issue 4, 365-385

Abstract: The paper examines the influence of altruism on voluntary transfers and government redistribution in a simple model: two jobs of different productivity are assigned by chance to two individuals. Ex ante the individuals are identical, ex post they have different incomes. The first part of the paper examines voluntary transfers determined ex post or agreed upon ex ante in the absence of altruism. In the second part, the influence of altruism is examined. Altruism is modelled as a pure public good: the minimum consumption (or income, since there is only one consumption good). Both individuals can contribute to its provision, one person by earning wage income, the other by voluntary transfers. The ex ante solutions generally lead to higher expected welfare but create several incentive problems. Only lump-sum transfers are considered.

Keywords: Altruism; redistributive taxation; social insurance; public good; voluntary transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 H21 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12-01
Note: Received: 28 February 1997 / Accepted: 31 January 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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