original papers: Implementation with partial verification

Nirvikar Singh and Donald Wittman

Review of Economic Design, 2001, vol. 6, issue 1, 63-84

Abstract: This paper examines the implementability of social choice functions when only partial verification of private information is possible. Green and Laffont (1986) used this framework to derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the revelation principle to continue to hold with partial verification. We provide economically interesting characterizations of this condition, which suggest that it may be too restrictive. This leads us to consider implementation (not necessarily truthful) in general, when there is partial verification. We consider the case where compensatory transfers are allowed, giving the mechanism designer further leeway. We show how partial verification may allow efficient implementation of bilateral trade, where it would otherwise not be possible.

Keywords: Implementation; partial verification; mechanism design; revelation principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-04-17
Note: Received: 1 August 1998 / Accepted: 5 September 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/papers/1006001/10060063.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:1:p:63-84

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10058

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Economic Design is currently edited by Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

More articles in Review of Economic Design from Springer, Society for Economic Design
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().