Solomon's Dilemma: An experimental study on dynamic implementation

Giovanni Ponti (), Anita Gantner, Dunia López-Pintado and Robert Montgomery
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Dunia Lopez Pintado

Review of Economic Design, 2003, vol. 8, issue 2, 217-239

Abstract: This paper reports an experimental investigation on two mechanisms for the so-called King Solomon Dilemma, where one of them fails to implement the social choice rule dynamically. We compare the two mechanisms in terms of their welfare, incentive and learning properties. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Experiments; implementation; backward induction; bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10058-003-0100-4 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: SOLOMON'S DILEMMA: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON DYNAMIC IMPLEMENTATION (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:217-239

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10058

DOI: 10.1007/s10058-003-0100-4

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Economic Design is currently edited by Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

More articles in Review of Economic Design from Springer, Society for Economic Design
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().