A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference

Shasikanta Nandeibam ()

Review of Economic Design, 2003, vol. 8, issue 3, 293-299

Abstract: We show that Barberá and Sonnenschein’s (1978) power function becomes additive if we replace the Paretian condition by nonimposition and monotonicity. Since these conditions are very much in the spirit of Arrow (1951), our result sharpens the analogy to Arrow’s theorem. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Social welfare scheme; binary; Paretian; nonimposed; monotonic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-003-0103-1

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