SMEs and public procurement policy

Pierre-Henri Morand ()

Review of Economic Design, 2003, vol. 8, issue 3, 318 pages

Abstract: In this paper, we characterize an optimal procurement policy as a mechanism design problem when an allotment of the contract is available, i.e., when a government faces both SMEs and large firms for carrying out a heterogeneously divisible project. Our model allows us to analyze all procurement policies (set-asides, favoritism, non-discriminatory rules), taking into account both efficiency and distributive arguments and derive a normative framework. We show that set-asides are not generally optimal, whatever the industrial preferences of the government are, while the optimal preferential treatments of firms implies complex non-linear rules. We prove that the optimal policy can be implemented using a modified Vickrey-type auction. We also consider that the firms can reduce their cost by a non observable effort, and exhibit the specific impact of cost reduction incentives on the optimal policies. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Auctions; SMEs; procurement; discrimination; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-003-0104-0

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