Manipulation of the Walrasian mechanism in production economies with unbounded short-selling

Laurence Kranich ()

Review of Economic Design, 2005, vol. 9, issue 2, 109-125

Abstract: Hurwicz (1979) and Otani and Sicilian (1982, 1990) characterized the Nash equilibrium allocations of the Walrasian demand manipulation game in successively more general exchange environments. In this paper, I extend the analysis to production economies with short-selling. First, I generalize Hurwicz’s and Otani and Sicilian’s theorem that any allocation at which each agent’s consumption bundle lies above her true offer curve can be supported in Nash equilibrium. I then show that for finite economies of any size the set of such allocations is often topologically large. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Manipulation; Walrasian Mechanism; Production; Short-Selling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-005-0123-0

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