Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller
Bernard Caillaud () and
Jacques Robert ()
Review of Economic Design, 2005, vol. 9, issue 2, 127-143
Abstract:
In a general auction framework with independent private values, we propose a game, with a simple economic interpretation, that allows to implement the revenue-maximizing auction outcome when the seller ignores the distributions of the different bidders’ valuations. In this detail-free implementation procedure, an ascending-price contest is organized and the winner volunteers a payment to the seller; this payment can then be challenged by another bidder who knows the distribution of the winner’s valuation. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:2:p:127-143
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-005-0125-y
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