Waiting for election season

Fouad Pervez ()

The Review of International Organizations, 2015, vol. 10, issue 2, 265-303

Abstract: Why do countries frequently wait long periods of time before initiating disputes at the World Trade Organization (WTO) over antidumping duties? Since the WTO usually rules in favor of the complainant, countries should initiate disputes as quickly as possible to limit the time their domestic industries are subject to these duties. However, countries often wait years before initiating a dispute. I argue that government leaders time disputes around their elections to gain political support from large domestic industries, particularly in developing countries with fewer economic resources and countries with highly contested domestic politics, where even small electoral gains are crucial. Using data on all WTO disputes over antidumping duties, I run a discrete time hazard model and find evidence that countries are more likely to bring up a dispute the closer they get to elections. As expected, the effect is particularly strong for divided governments and developing countries as elections draw near. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Antidumping duties; WTO; Trade disputes; Electoral politics; International development; F5; F0; F1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11558-015-9221-0

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