Not letting ‘bad apples’ spoil the bunch: Democratization and strict international organization accession rules

Christodoulos Kaoutzanis, Paul Poast () and Johannes Urpelainen
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Christodoulos Kaoutzanis: Columbia University
Paul Poast: University of Chicago
Johannes Urpelainen: Columbia University

The Review of International Organizations, 2016, vol. 11, issue 4, No 1, 399-418

Abstract: Abstract To solve their domestic and international problems, democratizing states often form new international organizations. In doing so, they face the question of institutional design: what types of rules and provisions should be included in the charter of the new international organization? We analyze this question through the lens of accession rules, with an emphasis on voting rules. We argue that democratizing states have strong incentives to design organizations with strict accession rules. Organizations with strict accession rules allow the founding members to regulate entry. This is particularly useful for transitional democracies, as democratizing states are initially unable to gain entry into the lucrative existing international organizations operated by the established democracies. Using original data on accession voting rules in 324 international organizations, we find strong evidence in support of our claims.

Keywords: Democratization; International organization; Voting rules; Accession criteria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11558-015-9237-5

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