Speech is silver, silence is golden? Examining state activity in international negotiations

Diana Panke ()
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Diana Panke: Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg

The Review of International Organizations, 2017, vol. 12, issue 1, No 5, 146 pages

Abstract: Abstract The institutional design of international organizations usually expresses state sovereignty, as each state has the same formal rights and obligations. This includes equal speaking rights in international negotiations. Becoming vocal is a means for states to signal national interests and influence international norms as well as to express their sovereignty. However, an analysis of 520 international negotiations demonstrates that states vary considerably in the usage of speaking rights. To addresses this puzzle, the paper presents an opportunity structure-incentives model and puts its observable implication to a comprehensive empirical test. This reveals that states operating in favourable conditions, most notably in small IOs, and states pursuing a broad scope of interests, being powerful and having strong international identities are most active in international negotiations. By contrast, smaller states that can neither rely on support of regional groups, nor on a government apparatus that effectively develops national positions are least likely to benefit from an equalizing institutional design of an international negotiation arena. Hence, there are limits to the extent to which an equalizing institutional design of IOs and regimes is able to mitigate real world structural differences between states.

Keywords: International negotiations; Negotiation Activity; States; Capacity; Power; Opportunity-structures; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11558-016-9244-1

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