Can human rights conditionality reduce repression? Examining the European Union’s economic agreements

Daniela Donno () and Michael Neureiter ()
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Daniela Donno: University of Pittsburgh
Michael Neureiter: University of Pittsburgh

The Review of International Organizations, 2018, vol. 13, issue 3, No 1, 335-357

Abstract: Abstract The insertion of human rights commitments into international economic agreements is now a widespread practice. We argue that the effect of such commitments depends on the degree of leverage held by one partner over the other. In a comprehensive analysis of the European Union’s (EU’s) relations with developing countries, we find that human rights clauses are conditionally effective; they are associated with improved political freedom and physical integrity rights only in countries that are more heavily dependent on EU aid. An in-depth look at the EU’s enforcement of its human rights clause in the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group reveals that the Union most often responds to violations of political rights—particularly coups and flawed elections—and that enforcement is indeed a more powerful catalyst for change in highly aid-dependent states. Alternative explanations—that the impact of the human rights clause depends on legalization, the country’s strategic importance, NGO activity, or domestic institutions—find little support.

Keywords: Human rights; European Union; Foreign aid; International law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11558-017-9283-2

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