Contested multilateralism as credible signaling: how strategic inconsistency can induce cooperation among states

Benjamin Faude () and Michal Parizek ()
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Benjamin Faude: London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Department of Government and Department of International Relations
Michal Parizek: Charles University

The Review of International Organizations, 2021, vol. 16, issue 4, No 5, 843-870

Abstract: Abstract This paper analyzes how patterns of international cooperation are affected if a group of states, led by a major power, pursues a strategy of “contested multilateralism” (CM). We conceptualize CM as a reaction to deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining where CM lowers the gains actors can reap from cooperation in the short run. We demonstrate that, in the long run, CM nevertheless can have positive effects on international cooperation and specify when this is the case. Because of the costs associated with it, CM conveys a credible signal of the resolve of a dissatisfied group of states to contest the institutional status quo. Due to this capacity, CM alters the institutional and strategic environment within which institutional adjustment bargaining takes place. As a result, CM opens up the possibility for inter-institutional accommodation that increases realized cooperation gains. We probe the plausibility of our theoretical reasoning with empirical case studies on competitive regime creation in multilateral development finance and on regime-shifting in the governance of international trade in genetically modified organisms.

Keywords: Regime complexes; Contested multilateralism; International cooperation; Thickly institutionalized international system; Credible signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s11558-020-09398-7

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