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Trade Wars and Election Interference

Ryan Brutger (), Stephen Chaudoin () and Max Kagan ()
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Ryan Brutger: University of California
Stephen Chaudoin: Harvard University
Max Kagan: University of California

The Review of International Organizations, 2023, vol. 18, issue 1, No 1, 25 pages

Abstract: Abstract In response to the Trump trade war, China, the EU, and other countries enacted politically-targeted trade retaliation (PTTR) against swing states and Republican strongholds in the United States. We argue that PTTR increases public concerns about foreign election interference and assess the effects of such retaliation across partisan affiliations. We test our predictions using a national survey experiment in the United States fielded before the 2020 election. In contrast to findings about sanctions and foreign endorsements, we find strong evidence that PTTR increases fears of election interference among both Republicans and Democrats. Partisan double standards in reaction to PTTR were strongest for retaliation targeting swing states and smaller for retaliation targeting the President’s base. Overall, the evidence shows that economic policies which are not primarily intended to influence elections may nevertheless come to be viewed by the public as foreign election interference.

Keywords: Trade war; Tariffs; Retaliation; Election interference; Intervention; public opinion; F13; F14; F15; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s11558-022-09464-2

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