Your silence speaks volumes: Weak states and strategic absence in the UN General Assembly

Julia C. Morse () and Bridget Coggins ()
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Julia C. Morse: University of California
Bridget Coggins: University of California

The Review of International Organizations, 2024, vol. 19, issue 3, No 5, 515-544

Abstract: Abstract Country participation in one-state, one-vote forums like the United Nations General Assembly often reflects underlying power asymmetries and endogenous political processes. Voting alignment is undoubtedly an important preference indicator. However, this paper contends that it is incomplete; silence is politically significant as well. Weak states use absence as a form of institutional power that shields them from geopolitical pressure and competing-principals problems. While abstention is a public signal of neutrality that undercuts voting unanimity, the ambiguous intent of absence makes it a distinct form of political expression. We examine the politics of absences at the General Assembly, highlighting how states may be strategically absent from select votes for political reasons. Building on the Bailey et al. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(2), 430–456, 2017 roll-call voting data, we distinguish strategic absences from other types of absence and provide evidence that such behavior is linked to US interests and competing-principals problems. Taking these non-random reasons for missingness into account provides a fuller picture of how weak states engage with international institutions and highlights how silence can be a consequence of larger political processes.

Keywords: International organizations; United Nations; General Assembly; Absence; Voting; Ideal point estimates; Preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09538-3

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