Good governance in autocratic international organizations

Emilie Hafner-Burton (), Jon C. W. Pevehouse () and Christina J. Schneider ()
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Emilie Hafner-Burton: University of California-San Diego
Jon C. W. Pevehouse: Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Wisconsin
Christina J. Schneider: Department of Political Science at the University of California

The Review of International Organizations, 2025, vol. 20, issue 2, No 4, 323-356

Abstract: Abstract A large and growing number of international organizations (IOs) are made up and governed by illiberal or outright authoritarian regimes. Many of these authoritarian IOs (AIOs) formally adopt good governance mandates, linking goals like democracy promotion, anti-corruption policies and human rights to their broader mission. Why do some AIOs adopt good governance mandates that appear to conflict with the norms and standards these regimes apply at home? We argue that AIOs adopt good governance mandates when they face substantial pressure from inside or outside the IO to adopt them. Central to our argument is that not all aspects of good governance are inherently or equally threatening to autocratic regimes. They pursue strategies that minimize the threat by externalizing policy outside the membership and strategically defining the goals to avoid or enact. This allows autocratic governments to uptake good governance talk but lessen any deep commitment to the norms and sometimes even to use them strategically to project their own power outside of the organization. Using data on 48 regional IOs with primarily autocratic membership between 1945 and 2015, we demonstrate that AIOs facing pressure from external good governance promoters will adopt good governance mandates but strategically shape those mandates in their favor if they can form bargaining coalitions with like-minded governments. The findings have sobering implications for the future of good governance promotion through IOs.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09550-7

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