Do corporate regulations deter or stimulate investment? The effect of the OECD anti-bribery convention on FDI

Lorenzo Crippa ()
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Lorenzo Crippa: University of Glasgow

The Review of International Organizations, 2025, vol. 20, issue 3, No 1, 415-441

Abstract: Abstract Countries prohibit firms’ transnational financial crime by coordinating their regulations under international organizations (IOs). Under these IOs, states threaten to prosecute firms’ foreign misconduct at home. Such threats can help conscript companies to diffuse sustainable business models abroad. This paper studies the effect of corporate criminal regulations on firms’ foreign direct investment (FDI). Critics of these policies claim they push firms’ investment away from host economies where financial crime is more likely to happen. Yet, regulations should also cut informal costs of crime and favor investment. I reconcile these opposed expectations and show they are special cases of the same argument. I claim that the effect of multilateral anti-bribery policies on FDI depends on the level of corruption of the host economy. It is null in non-corrupt countries. It is positive where corruption is moderate: here, laws provide legal leverage to refuse paying bribes and cut corruption costs. The effect is negative where corruption is endemic: here, anti-bribery laws expose firms to additional regulatory costs. I support the argument with multiple evidence. Company-level data on investment by 3871 firms between 2006 and 2011 show that regulated corporations have a $$27\%$$ 27 % higher probability of investing in moderately corrupt economies than unregulated firms, which plummets to $$-52\%$$ - 52 % in extremely corrupt countries. A synthetic counterfactual design using country-dyadic FDI flows corroborates this finding. Results show that regulatory policies harmonized by IOs change international competition for FDI in ways that do not necessarily harm regulated firms.

Keywords: Foreign direct investment; International corporate regulations; Anti-bribery; OECD anti-bribery convention; OECD (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11558-023-09519-y

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