Effective climate clubs require ambition, leverage and insulation: Theorizing issue linkage in climate change and trade

Sam S. Rowan ()
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Sam S. Rowan: Concordia University

The Review of International Organizations, 2025, vol. 20, issue 3, No 8, 605-630

Abstract: Abstract Many proposals advocate linking climate and trade policy to improve climate cooperation. Since climate mitigation is non-excludable, mitigation cannot be enforced through issue-specific reciprocity, but linking mitigation with trade penalties on non-participants could incorporate trade’s enforcement powers into a climate club. However, this perspective has overlooked the relationship between climate policy preferences and existing trade flows. Using a model of issue linkage in climate and trade motivated by findings from the domestic political economy of international trade, I show that the necessary conditions for climate clubs are exacting. Effective climate–trade clubs require members with high levels of climate policy ambition, export leverage over laggards, and insulation from trade retaliation. However, I show that these three attributes do not necessarily co-occur theoretically or empirically. States that support the club’s goals on one dimension may undermine them on another. The findings provide insights into institutional design, climate politics, and the constraints on issue linkage in international cooperation.

Keywords: International cooperation; Institutional design; Climate change; International trade; Carbon border adjustments; Climate tariffs; Sanctions; Issue linkage; Reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F18 F53 F64 Q54 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09535-6

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