Early birds: Special interests and the strategic logic of international cooperation

Johannes Urpelainen ()

The Review of International Organizations, 2011, vol. 6, issue 2, 113-140

Keywords: Special interests; International cooperation; Political economy; Institutional design; Game theory; C72; D72; F53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/s11558-010-9099-9

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