Evolutionary games between subject categories

Rosa Rodriguez-Sánchez (), J. A. García () and J. Fdez-Valdivia ()
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Rosa Rodriguez-Sánchez: Universidad de Granada
J. A. García: Universidad de Granada
J. Fdez-Valdivia: Universidad de Granada

Scientometrics, 2014, vol. 101, issue 1, No 41, 869-888

Abstract: Abstract Here we examine the evolution of journal sharing between scientific subject categories, using evolutionary game theory. We assume that there is journal sharing between subject categories if they share common scholarly journals. In this paper, the Prisoners’ dilemma (within evolutionary game theory) is used as a metaphor for the problems surrounding the evolution of journal sharing between scientific subject categories. Using evolutionary games, here we show that connections between categories (that share common journals) can enable journal sharing to persist indefinitely on stationary configurations. The conclusion is that journal sharing between subject categories is an evolutionary advantage. Using a set of experiments, we have explored the asymptotic behaviour of this system for various values of the model’s parameter and the results seem robust. Subject categories are described in terms of graphs, such that categories occupy the vertices. Sharing categories are connected through the edges of those graphs. The combination of evolutionary game theory and graph theory provides the flexibility for carrying out more realistic simulations.

Keywords: Scientific subject categories; Journal sharing; Evolutionary games; Evolutionary advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11192-014-1255-1

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