The new Norwegian incentive system for publication: from bad to worse

Kjetil Haugen and Frode E. Sandnes ()
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Frode E. Sandnes: Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences

Scientometrics, 2016, vol. 109, issue 2, No 32, 1299-1306

Abstract: Abstract The new Norwegian system for calculation of publication credits is examined. The new system was launched due to criticism for penalizing collaborative research. It turns out that adverse incentive problems emerge as a result of this system change. We show by a simple case, that institutions will benefit (credit-wise) by adding more authors to a scientific publication. Even worse, the beneficial effect increases the more authors the paper has initially. Alternative cases indicate even stronger incentives for co-author maximization.

Keywords: Research; Reward system; Adverse incentive effects; Norway (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11192-016-2075-2

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