Problems with open participation in peer review

J. A. García (), Rosa Rodriguez-Sánchez and J. Fdez-Valdivia
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J. A. García: Universidad de Granada
Rosa Rodriguez-Sánchez: Universidad de Granada
J. Fdez-Valdivia: Universidad de Granada

Scientometrics, 2017, vol. 112, issue 3, No 37, 1885 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this letter, we study an open participation model of peer review in which potential reviewers choose whether to review a manuscript, at a cost, without a formal invitation. The outcome is a compromise among the reviewers’ recommendations. Here we show that the equilibrium number of reviewers in the public peer review is small, their recommendations are extreme, and the outcome is likely to be random when the compromise is the median of the reviewers’ recommendations.

Keywords: Peer review; Open participation; Potential reviewers; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11192-017-2445-4

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